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Abstract 
This article explores John Dewey’s conceptualization of the public as polity in his lecture notes 
from 1928. Dewey’s conceptualization suggests an account of the democratic legitimacy of 
public regulation of economic activities by focusing on polity members’ mutual interest. 
Contextualized through Dewey’s involvement in practical politics the article specifies the 
conceptualization by a policy focus on natural resources and technology, and explores and 
discusses it through two issues for democratic control over policy development: centralization of 
power in federal government; and the failure to understand, predict and control consequences of 
technology. Finally, exploring its relevance in a context of economic globalization the article 
rearticulates the conceptualization in terms of transnational relations and solidarities, using the 
transnational peasant organization La Via Campesina as an example. 
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Introduction: Dewey’s conception of the public and the need for contextualization 
John Dewey’s The Public and Its Problems (1927) was published in times of comprehensive 
economic changes in the USA. While readings have tended to contextualize the book through 
Dewey’s discussions with Walter Lippmann,1 Dewey’s diagnosis of the problem of the public 
may at the same time be seen to respond to a set of serious consequences of economic activities. 
Against the background of his definition of the public as those who are “affected by the indirect 
consequences of transactions” (LW2, 245–246) Dewey refers to segments of the working 
population with no legal protection or security: child workers, workers with no insurance against 
illness, no old age pension or minimal wage, and women workers without legal protection of their 
maternal health.2 The diagnosis thus points to the dire need for public regulation of economic 
activities. Yet, in lecture notes from 19283 Dewey provides a reconceptualization of the public as 
polity that has passed unnoticed in the scholarly literature: the public, he suggests, is constituted 
on the basis of members’ “mutual interest” in transactions and their control (Dewey 1928). In this 
article I take this conceptualization as suggesting an account of the democratic legitimacy of 
regulation of economic activities (section 1). In his lectures, however, Dewey fails to specify 
policy areas for regulation as well as to consider ways in which a polity could exert effective 
democratic control over policy development. Therefore, in order to explore the conceptualization 
and its continuing relevance I will interpret it through other texts but also by turning to Dewey’s 
actual involvement in practical politics in the late 1920s and the 30s.4 Through two organizations 
Dewey helped to found and run he promoted policies for public regulation while holding 
regulation in certain policy areas as crucial for a more equal distribution of opportunities: natural 
resource development and technological infrastructure implementation for resource development 
and distribution of produced goods and services (section 2). As for the matter of democratic 
control over policy development, I select two issues for consideration. Firstly, while Dewey 
along with many progressives held corporate concentration of economic power to be a major 
problem for democracy, he also saw the evolving centralization of power in federal government 
and administration as an obstacle. In respons to this problem, the organization Dewey co-founded 
with John Marsh, the People’s Lobby, developed practices for countering this concentration of 
power through an “ongoing support for a congressionally centered federal government” (Lee 
2015, 8). I briefly contrast these practices with a prominent historical example of so-called 
“decentralized administration” in the area of natural resource development: the Tennessee Valley 
Authority (section 3). Secondly, anticipating David Collingridge’s classical work in technology 
assessment (1980), Dewey saw the failure to understand, predict and control consequences of 
science and technology as a major problem for democratic control of policy development (section 
                                                          
1 See for example Westbrook 1991; Bohman 2004, 2010; MacGilvray 2010, Rogers 2009, 197–206, 2010. 
2 See LW2,  274–275; Dewey 1928. 
3 Dewey gave lectures in social and political philosophy four times at Columbia University between 1923 and 1928 
(see Deen 2016, 509). While only lecture notes for the first of these series of lectures have been published (in 
MW15, 230–272), I will refer mainly to the upublished lecture notes for the last series of these  lectures. 




4). In view of this problem’s lingering relevance I explore Dewey’s model of social inquiry as a 
way of engaging citizens’ needs and concerns and to support their capacity to influence policy 
development (section 5). I end by considering how the discussed institutional and epistemic 
problems for democratic control may reflect back on Dewey’s conceptualization of the public as 
polity and its current relevance. Noting with John Naryan (2016) how Dewey observed and 
assessed adverse consequences of an evolving economic globalization before World War One, I 
explore how his conceptualization of the public may apply to evolving transnational relations of 
mutual interest and solidarity, using the contemporary transnational peasant organization La Via 
Campesina as an example (section 6). 
 
1. Conceptualizing the public as polity 
Like the definition of the public in The Public and Its Problems (TPIP) Dewey’s 
reconceptualization of the public in his lecture notes from 1928 focuses on action consequences 
in need of regulation. Nevertheless, the reconceptualization distinguishes itself from the former 
definition by extending its focus from particularly affected individuals and groups to “members 
of the entire community” (Dewey 1928). As the lecture notes suggest, the new conceptualization 
draws on Thorstein Veblen’s analyses of how economic activities affect life conditions and 
opportunities for all members of an industrial society.5 Like Veblen Dewey’s lectures stress that, 
through technology development and expanding markets, producers and end-consumers have 
become dependent on large business corporations in control of means of production, distribution 
and finance. In his brief historical account, “a new source of power … [involving] control of 
means of production, transportation and credit, finance –  took the place of dynasties as potential 
and actual oppressive powers” (Dewey 1928). Moreover, this  “new source of power” gave rise to 
“a sense of abuses and oppressions … that have to be remedied by collective endeavour” (Dewey 
1928). As for actual “collective endeavour” Dewey elsewhere tends to focuse on the achievement 
of federal regulations and legislations that had been initiated by popular associations through the 
Progressive Era (1890–1920). Associations of farmers, workers, and women struggled for 
comprehensive federal reforms, and in TPIP Dewey cites a reference to several successful 
achievements: “ ‘regulation of railways, popular election of senators, national income tax, 
suffrage for women’” (LW2: 310).6 In his lectures he adds the general comment that a 
“democratic movement evinces” and that there is a “coming to consciousness of the public 
interest” (Dewey 1928).  
Against this historical background Dewey presents his conceptualization of the public as 
polity and as a democratic basis for regulation. The public is abstractly conceived as a  
                                                          
5 See in particular the lecture notes for the lectures given in 1923: MW15, 241, 262, 266, 269, 272. For a general 
account of Veblen’s influence on Dewey, see Tilman 1998.   
6 The historical sociologist Elisabeth Clemens sees in the Progressive Era “a new politics based in associational life” 




community bound together by a “mutual interest in transactions” and their control, not by shared 
moral commitments, like “the Great Community” evoked in TPIP.7 The public is thus defined as: 
 
“an as[s]ociation of related individuals which is functionally constituted; that is, related on 
the basis of mutual interest in transactions which go on between members of the entire 
community; and which therefore constitute … the basis of an attempted control of the 
conditions under which these transactions occur.” (Dewey 1928, original emph.)  
 
The polity’s “functional constitution” turns on a mutual interest in transactions and their control. 
Such interest is not assigned to individuals as members of groups already existing due to 
economic or biological needs.8 Rather, the interest at stake is “derived, secondary or mediated” 
and distinct from, yet dependent on, the “primary interests” one would share as member in 
“primary, spontaneous, more direct groupings”, such as economic and professional groups or 
families. The distinction involved is further stressed by Dewey’s qualification of an interest in 
control as an “interest in the conditions under which other associations operate” (Dewey 1928, 
my emph., T.M.).  
Nevertheless, the political community’s dependence on “primary groupings” has 
implications for the conceptualization of conditions for political participation. Revisiting 
Aristotle’s classical determination of man as “a political animal” Dewey takes “political” (or its 
latin counterpart “civic”) to equal “social in a generic sense”;9 and he adds the further 
qualification that “man is only indirectly and by stress a political animal” (Dewey 1928). Yet, 
Dewey does not simply stress Walter Lippmann’s point that individuals have limited epistemic 
capacities for political participation.10 Rather, Dewey suggests that through “primary groupings” 
people may aquire motivating reasons for becoming politically interested in the first place. Such 
motivating reasons could be acquired from suffering “abuses or oppressions” stemming from 
concentration of economic power.11 As seen in the past, however, such abuses and oppressions 
are of the kind that “have to be remedied by collective endeavour” (Dewey 1928). Yet, while 
polity members’ “mutual interest” would make regulatory policies and institutions legitimate, the 
abstract conceptualization of the public fails to specify ways in which members could negotiate 
their mutual interest and make it the basis for effective democratic control of policy development.  
                                                          
7 See in particular LW2, 328–329. 
8 Later, in Freedom and Culture (1939), Dewey uses the term “functional in a similar sense: “On account of the vast 
extension of the field of association, produced by elimination of distance and lengthening of temporal spans, it is 
obvious that social agencies, political and non-political, cannot be confined to localities … To a very considerable 
extent, groups having a functional basis will probably have to replace those based on physical contiguity” (LW13, 
177, my emph. T.M.). 
9 This sets Dewey’s political philosophy apart from variants of civic republicanism in which political activity is taken 
not only to overcome economic and biological constraints, but to have a distinct anthropological basis, compared 
to other social activities, a view stated most distinctively in 20th century political philosophy in Hannah Arendt’s The 
Human Condition (1998 [1958]). 
10 See Lippmann 1997 (1922), 23–52; 1993 (1927), 11, 25, 29. 
11 In fact, Dewey mentions one particular issue, economically powerful agents’ influence on electorial politics in 
terms of “campaign contributions” (Dewey 1928). 
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 Historically, the abstractness of Dewey’s conceptualization may be seen to reflect two 
circumstances. Firstly, as stressed by Dewey in TPIP, federal institutions had failed to implement 
regulatory policies widely perceived as required, as shown by the fate of the “Child Labour 
Amendment” (LW2, 311). This failure had left “[t]he public … so confused and eclipsed that it 
cannot even use the organs through which it is supposed to mediate political action and polity” 
(LW2, 311). Against this background, a polity defined rather through the members’ mutual 
interest suggests a projected and ideal democratic basis for regulatory policies, abstracted from 
effective institutional means to develop or promote such policies. Secondly, on a practical 
political level, the abstractly conceived relation between polity members suggests the need for 
new alignments between voluntary associations across civil society. Like many on the left side in 
politics, Dewey saw the binary party system as incapable of initiating the required regulations.12 
Already in the presidential election of 1924 Dewey had supported Robert La Follette Sr.’s 
Progressive Party13 which mobilized support across associations of workers and farmers. In 
hindsight, the abstractly conceived public may be seen to prepare intellectual ground for Dewey’s 
own practical political efforts through The League for Independent Political Action (LIPA)14 and 
The People’s Lobby (PL)15 that sought to build similar alliances in the late 1920s and the 30s. In 
fact, policies developed and promoted by these organizations, as well as practices developed by 
the PL in particular, provide clues for further exploring and specifying the abstract 
conceptualization of the public. My exploration will proceed along two lines. Firstly, policies 
promoted by both organizations serve to specify “conditions of transactions” to be subjected to 
public control: I focus on policies for public control over natural resources and technological 
infrastructures requisite for resource development and for distribution of produced goods and 
services (section 2). Secondly, I proceed by consulting both Dewey’s theoretical work and his 
political practice through the PL in discussing how public control could become democratic 
control. I focuse on two issues: the evolving centralization of power in federal government and 
administration (section 3); and the failure to understand, predict and control consequences of 
science and technology (section 4). 
 
 2. Conditions of transactions: technological infrastructures and natural resources 
Public control over transportation was needed since, Dewey argued, “[p]rivate means of transport 
stand like a stone wall between producer and consumer” and the “gross income” of transport 
corporations has virtually become “a tax on the producing and consuming public” (LW9, 285). 
Moreover, his involvement in the LIPA’s and the PL’s policy development was premised on a 
perception of the increasing dependence of agricultural and industrial producers on products and 
technological services provided by others, and by the dependence of end-consumers on available 
                                                          
12 See LW2: 311. 
13 See Westbrook 1991, 269, 278. 
14 See Brown 1968. 
15 See Lee 2015. 
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and affordable products and services in the market.16 In the mid-1930s Dewey adopted a legal 
phrase to stress how new economic dependencies had in effect made all industrial and 
commercial activities “affected with a public interest”:17  
“[I]ndustry, banking and commerce have reached a point where there is no such thing as 
merely private initiative and enterprise. For the consequences of private business 
enterprise affect so many persons and in such deep and enduring ways that all business is 
affected with a public interest” (LW11, 287). 
However, technology development in one particular industry had crucial consequences for all 
other industries, and for commercial, as well as domestic life: the electric power industry. In fact, 
hydro electric power was a national policy issue through three decades, starting with president 
Theodore Roosevelt’s veto in 1903 against a bill permitting a private power company to build a 
hydro-power dam in Muscle Shoals at the Tennessee river.18 The rapid development of 
technological infrastructures for production and distribution of hydropower, as well as coal based 
power, made the issue of control immiment. Turbins, generators and transmission lines with 
increasing capacities enabled ever more extensive production and distribution. While toward the 
end of the 19th century production and distribution of electric power was largely a municipality 
affair, in the second decade of the 20th century technological infrastructures enabled power 
distribution beyond regulatory regimes of state legislatures and state commissions. For example, 
by 1912 Samuel S. Insull’s Middle West Utilities Company had developed and implemented 
infrastructures serving hundreds of munipalities across 13 states.19 In fact, in his capacity as 
president for the PL Dewey later confirmed that “the [electric] power issue is the most weighty 
single issue in the political field” (LW6, 166).20 Moreover, his further comment that “some of the 
big companies producing electric power are hardly more than branches of big financial houses”, 
and carry an “immense complex of production and finance” (LW6, 165), suggests a main 
problem in regulation. By way of utility holding companies power corporations like the Middle 
West Utilities had built up immense capital bases in the 1920s in ways that were largerly 
withdrawn from public regulation and inspection. While selling electricity retail in a given state 
was regulated, selling electricity wholesale across states through the grid system was not.21 Due 
                                                          
16 See LW6, 178. 
17 The phrase was introduced in the Munn v. Illinois case (1876) where U.S. Supreme Court sustained the right of 
the state government of Illinois to fix “reasonable rates” for services provided by a Chicago grain elevator company. 
For an assessment of the historical significance of this Supreme Court decision, see Hamilton 1930. 
18 See King 1959, 4–5. 
19 See Lambert 2015, 30. 
20 In TPIP Dewey points out how “the rapid development of hydro-electric and super-power” has become a matter 
of “public concern” (LW2, 320). “In the long run”, he thinks, “few questions exceed it in importance” (LW2, 320). 
21 See Lambert 2015, 28–30, 32–36. In 1933 the laywer Ernest O. Eisenberg wrote: “The holding company has a 
definite place in our modern economic civilization. But it is imperative that our legislatures, commissions, and 
courts recognize that American society cannot tolerate the continuation of those legal principles which made 
possible the outrageous exploitation of the consuming and investing public by the holding companies in the past 
eight years. The law must either yield to modern changes, or break.” (1933, 291) 
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to this regulatory gap such “immense complex of production and finance” was overdue to 
become subjected to direct regulation. In fact, both the PL and the LIPA focused on electric 
power in their first policy statements, and the PL proposed publicly owned power systems as an 
alternative to regulation.22  
Through the LIPA and the PL Dewey called for public control over land use and natural 
resources development. Yet, this policy orientation, too, had long been established in the US 
through the Conservation Movement, fronted by former president Theodore Roosevelt and 
Gifford Pinchot, the first chief of the United States Forest Service. In fact, in voicing the LIPA’s 
general policy Dewey echoed the Conservationists: “[s]ince private control of natural resources, 
of the land with its mines, mineral deposits, water power, oil, natural gas, is the stronghold of 
monopolistic privilege, it must be attacked in its fortress” (LW6, 178). Already in his lectures in 
the 1920s Dewey held that “ownership of land and natural resources” had extensive and enduring 
consequences beyond owners and users (Dewey 1928), and he warned of a “ruthless exploitation 
of natural resources without reference to conservation for future users” (MW15, 262). In a speech 
given for the PL Dewey appealed directly to Pinchot’s authority in proposing a policy of taxation 
of land values for achieving “elimination of waste and conservation of natural resources” (LW9, 
286). Furthermore, he presented rationales for conservation that resonate with Conservationist 
ideology. The Conservationists defended public control over a coordinated development of 
resources in land, rivers and forests to sustain a variety of social and economic needs.23 Dewey 
equally defended society’s right to excert control over land taken in an extended sense as the 
ultimate source of all economic production and the sustaining basis of all material human needs.24 
Both Dewey and Pinchot found the ultimate justification for public control over natural resources 
in the principle of equal opportunity.25 Even in the technological era, Dewey argued, land would 
be “the final source of all productivity” (LW11, 256), and thus the sustaining basis of 
opportunities citizens have to be “socially useful” and “to develop personal powers … through 
some form of creative activity” (LW11, 256). To both Dewey and Pinchot, then, public control 
over natural resources was a first, necessary step to provide for a more equal distribution of 
opportunities. Nevertheless, Dewey criticised the most prominent implementation of 
Conservationist policies during the New Deal: the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).  
The TVA was created as a federal governmental agency for development of hydro-electric 
power in 1935, and it was celebrated as the single largest victory of Conservationist policy 
development.26 As the largest public utility corporation ever built in the USA the TVA contributed 
to rapidly ascending numbers of electrified homes and rising average income levels in the 
                                                          
22 See Lee 2015, 65. 
23 See Pinchot 1945–1946, 15. 
24 “Land is the ground on which houses, stores, shops and factories are built. It is the ground farmers cultivate and 
from which comes all food, all textiles and all the bricks, wood and stone from which buildings are made. But it also 
includes all mines, all minerals, iron and oil; it includes water power, as well as coal, that are the ultimate sources of 
electric power” (LW11, 256). 
25 See Pinchot 1911, 79. 
26 See King 1959, 267–276.  
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Tennessee Valley region,27 and it was seen as an example for economic development in other 
regions as well.28 Encouraged by the TVA’s speedy implementation of public control over vast 
water power resources Dewey and Marsh proposed policies for achieving public control over 
other natural resources as well.29 At the same time, however, Dewey criticised the TVA in terms 
of how its own policy priorities issued in discriminatory benefits. Due to electrification, fertilizer 
production and distribution, as well as improved flood control, land values would rise in the 
Tennessee Valley; such increment would benefit mainly the larger land owners and enable 
speculation.30 Through the TVA, as well as other New Deal programs, Dewey thus saw the 
imminent possibility of a “private monopolization of opportunity” (LW11, 256). 
This concern with the TVA invites a further question: how could policies for public control 
over natural resource development be subjected to effective democratic control?  
 
3. Centralization of power and the issue of democratic control 
In the early 1930s Dewey observed how demands for efficiency in a government’s handling of 
issues of large scale and complexity had invited an importation of organizational forms involving 
concentration and centralization of power.31 In fact, already in the early 1920s he critically noted 
how increasing efficiency in large organizations came at the cost of members’ opportunity to 
participate in decisions. Hence, “power is centralized” and “a small number of persons assume 
responsibility for total administration, relegating to the rest of those involved to the status of 
automata” (LC, 88). Particulary in organizations of “representative government”, he later 
emphasised, this is unfortunate since in the imported forms of administration members are left to 
be ”subordinates … [that] … have no active part in making plans or forming policies—the 
function comparable to the legislative in government—nor in adjudicating disputes which 
arise…” (LW7, 353). Moreover, Dewey further asked how large-scale representative democracy 
can develope ways of responding to evolving popular needs, rather than yielding to “those who 
can work political machinery for their own private profit” (LW7, 353). 
In fact, an early organizational approach to this problem of centralization is the TVA’s 
decentralized admininstration.32 TVA chairman David Lilienthal saw the TVA’s arrangements for 
                                                          
27 See Lilienthal 1944, 20–21, 34.  
28 In a speech in 1933 president F.D. Roosevelt said of TVA that “we have an opportunity of setting an example of 
planning, not just for ourselves but for generations to come …” (quoted from Lilienthal 1944, 66). 
29 See Lee 2015, 114. 
30 Dewey already in 1935 warned that “[t]he new values that will result from [the TVA project] are going to be 
absorbed by those who monopolize the land and the machines that are made out of the products of the land” 
(LW11, 257).  Few years later this concern was brought up in internal policy discussions in the TVA about whether 
the TVA should, for public purposes, invest in establishing a considerable reservoir protective strip. The proponents 
(who eventually lost) argued that one should “capture for the public the incremental value created by the new 
reservoirs, an increment which would otherwise accrue to only a limited number of individuals” (Selznick 1949, 
200).  
31 LW7, 353. 
32 See Lilienthal 1944, 133–166.    
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local involvement to provide democratic legitimacy for the TVA as a federal government agency, 
and for the very implementation of the TVA Act passed by the Congress in 1933. He even 
formulated such legitimacy in terms of Dewey’s requirement that “democratic ends demand 
democratic methods for their realization” (1943, 201).33 Nevertheless, as critics have pointed out, 
TVA’s decentralized arrangements had other objectives as well, such as protecting the TVA’s 
managerial autonomy within the federal system.34 Moreover, as Philip Selznick’s classical study 
(1949) shows, the local administrative organizations35 used by the TVA to enable local 
involvement already cooperated with the American Farm Bureau Federation, a federal voluntary 
organization for the more prosperous farm owners and with a powerful lobby in Washington. The 
TVA’s reliance on such an organization thus involved a selection of local participators for 
programs and educational measures that was influenced by the Bureau.36 Through such 
cooperation local groups of the more prosperous farmers became what Selznick calls “client 
publics” (1949, 129), while the American Farm Bureau in turn gained informal influence on 
policy development in the TVA through process of “informal cooptation”.37 Moreover, due to the 
American Farm Bureau’s influence the poorest segments of the farming population were largely 
excluded from involvement in TVA programs. In addition, tentant farmers and sharecroppers who 
were displaced from reservoir areas did not receive compensations and assistance as the 
landowning farmers did.38 Although the TVA’s selective and discriminatory ways of responding 
to demands and needs of the local farming population could partly be seen as unanticipated 
consequences of the adopted administration sheme,39 they strikingly contradicted Lilienthal’s 
democratic legitimization, articulated in the name of an undifferentiated polity or “people”.40  
How, then, could Dewey’s dictum that “democratic ends demand democratic methods” be 
otherwise understood and applied to the problem of concentration of power in central 
government? Moving from theoretical analysis to practice we may note how the PL recognized 
and responded to the problem. The organization had a strategic focus on a national policy level, 
                                                          
33 Lilienthal quotes from Dewey’s Freedom and Culture (1939): “The conflict as it concems the democracy to which 
our history commits us is within our own institutions and attitudes. It can be won only by extending the application 
of democratic methods, methods of consultation, persuasion, negotiation, communication, co-operative 
intelligence, in the task of making our own politics, industry, education, our cultures generally, a servant and an 
evolving manifestation of democratic ideas . . .  democratic ends demand democratic methods for their realization” 
(LW13, 187). 
34 See Lamberts 2015, 81–84.  
35 In particular, through the Agricultural Extension Service and the Land Grant Colleges the TVA gave local farmers 
and their organizations influence over distribution of artificial fertilizers and practices introduced for improving 
agricultural production and preventing soil erosion (see Selznick 1949, 117–141).  
36 For example, “[t]he approach in extension service and TVA has been to deal with tenancy through the farm 
owners, considering sharecroppers as part of the larger farm unit … there is evidence that the Agricultural Relations 
Department does not consider high or increasing rates of tenancy a problem” (Selznick 1949, 138).  
37 Informal cooptation is defined as "the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-
determining structure of an organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence” (1949: 13) 
38 See Selznick 1949, 138–140.  
39 See Selznick 1949, 144. 




which was typical of popular associations in the late Progressive Era.41 Morever, on Mordecai 
Lee’s interpretation (2015), the PL’s career provides an alternative to “the conventional 
narrative” of American public administration which “lauds [F.D.Roosevelt’s] efforts to 
strengthen the presidency vis-à-vis Congress” (Lee 2015, 8). In so far, the PL presents “a counter 
narrative” through its “fierce opposition to this trend and its ongoing support for a 
congressionally centered federal government” (2015, 8). Working as a “multi-issue public 
interest” organization (2015, 6) the PL occasionally coordinated its efforts with other voluntary 
organizations to enforce pressure on the federal government.42 Moreover, through a variety of 
ways the PL sought to hold Congress representatives accountable to their constituents and thus to 
strengthen the democratic legitimacy of policy proposals. Through congressual hearings, 
communication with Congress representatives, through organizing conferences involving 
Congress representatives and having the conferences broadcasted on national radio and covered 
by national press,43 the PL sought to sustain and improve the accountability of representatives of 
the legislative assembly, and thus to enforce democratic control of the central government. An 
example of the efforts to hold federal government and Congress accountable was the harsh 
criticism of the TVA’s land policies that Dewey originally put forth in a speech in Washington, 
DC, and that was broadcasted on national radio.44 The concern with the TVA’s lacking 
accountability was thus brought up for a national audience and for politicians in Washington to 
enable democratic control.  
Yet, the TVA’s “decentralized administration” not only raises issues of democratic 
accountability: it further evokes the question of how both experts and lay people may understand 
and assess social consequences of industrial technologies, and how experts could assist and 
support democratic control over policy development and implementation.  
 
4. Failure to understand and control consequences of science and technology   
In TPIP Dewey suggests that democratic control over implementation of new technologies 
depends on a kind of knowledge which is lacking: “the prime condition of a democratically 
organized public is a kind of knowledge which does not yet exist” (LW2, 339). Underlying this 
comment is a paradox that he spelled out on a later occasion. On the one hand, he observes, 
incessant scientific specialization has made the understanding of scientific affairs the privilege of 
ever smaller circles of experts;45 on the other, science’s social impact has increased dramatically 
through technological applications that “pervade and permeate [and] determine, every aspect of 
social life” (LW9, 97). The “new social impact of science” involves not only valued advances “in 
agriculture and all the varied forms of productive industry” (LW9, 97), but consequences 
                                                          
41 According to historical sociologist Elisabeth Clemens, popular associations tended in the late Progressive Era “to 
shift their attention from state to national politics” (1997, 296). 
42 See Lee 2015, 81–83, 96, 113–114.   
43 Lee 2015, 6–7.  
44See LW11, 256–257 and Lee 2015, 123. 
45LW9, 96. See also LW2, 312; LW2, 343–34; LW2, 363–364. 
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increasingly perceived as problematic, such as weapons with increasing capacity to kill and 
involving “increased expenditures for armament” (LW9, 97). Yet, peace-time implements could 
also be taken as morally reprehensible through industry’s “brutal exploitation of nature and man” 
(LW2, 344), and, more indirectly, through persistent want in the midts of technological 
“potentiality of plenty, of ease and security, for all”  (LW9, 98). Dewey’s comment about a 
knowledge “which does not yet exist” (LW2, 339) refers to the failure of understanding, 
predicting and controlling such consequences of science and technology.  
Dewey did not share the Conservationists’ optimistic idea of progress based on scientific 
and technological control.46 He expressed humbleness as to the prospect of predicting and 
controlling consequences of technological interventions.47 Dewey had learned from Veblen that 
there are limits to how social consequences of new technologies can be anticipated. 
Implementation of new technologies is conditioned by social practices and traditions, as well as 
inherited political institutions and laws, and in ways that may obstruct or conflict with professed 
policy goals.48 Moreover, use of new technologies of production and transporation tend to affect 
consumers’ practices and preferences in ways unforseen by legislators and public administrators. 
Dewey ponders that “the natural energies released by use of machinery have consequences 
independent of human foresight; [they] create new wants and set new conditions, for example, 
rapid transit and transportation” (MW15, 258–259). New modes of consumption thus emerge less 
as results of rational choice or planning49 than as, in Veblen’s terminology, “[o]stentatious waste 
and conspicuous consumption” (MW15, 262). In addition, new products may carry risks for 
human health.50  
Dewey anticipates David Collingridge’s now classic formulation of the dilemma of social 
control of technology (1980). On the one hand, Collingridge points out, interactions between 
technology and society are so poorly understood that harmful consequences of “the fully 
developed technology cannot be predicted with sufficient confidence to justify the imposition of 
controls” (1980, 17). On the other hand, when harmful consequences of a sufficiently developed 
and diffused technology become apparent, the latter is no longer easily controlled because social 
                                                          
46 Note Samuel P. Hayes’ assessment: “The new realms of science and technology, appearing to open up unlimited 
opportunities for human achievements, filled conservation leaders with intense optimism. They emphasized 
expansion, not rentrenchment, possibilities, not limitations. True, they expressed some fear that diminishing 
resources would creat critical shortages in the future. But they were not Malthusian profets of despair and gloom … 
They displayed that deep sense of hope which pervaded all those at the turn of the century for whom science and 
technology were visions of an abundant future” (Hayes 1999, 2–3).  
47 Note his comment in Experience and Nature (1925): “Through science we have secured a degree of power of 
prediction and of control; through tools, machinery and an accompanying technique we have made the world more 
conformable to our needs, a more secure abode. We have heaped up riches and means of comfort between 
ourselves and the risks of the world … But when all is said and done, the fundamentally hazardous character of the 
world is not seriously modified, much less eliminated.” (LW1, 45). 
48 Dewey was influenced both by Veblen’s (1912 [1899]) and William F. Ogburn’s (1922) respective theses of 
cultural lag (see MW15, 259; LW2, 323; LW5, 48–50; Dewey 2012, 161–162).  
49 Dewey echoed Veblen in his general comment that “[t]he market and business determine wants, not the 
reverse” (MW15, 264. See also LW2, 301). 
50 “Risks of innovation in consumption greater than in production – qualitative, health … ” (Dewey 1928). 
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and economic institutions, as well as other technologies, have become adjusted to the new 
technology, and control becomes “very disruptive and expensive” (1980, 18). Collingridge’s 
example of the Green Revolution in effect updates Dewey’s observations of how technology 
implementation issues in “persistent want”, despite “potentiality of plenty, of ease and security, 
for all”: the Green Revolution was to provide protein rich food to the poorest segments of the 
population in developing countries, but largely failed due to the ways in which new agricultural 
technologies were accommodated to local inherited institutions that sustained economic 
inequalities.51 An other of Collingridge’s examples, the extensive and enduring use of lead in 
petrol, food canning and in pipe lines for drinking water distribution, brings up the issue of 
environmental hazards and health risks associated with technologies.52 Generally, through the 
20th century adverse consequences of new technologies have been hard to control or eliminate 
due to ignorance and lacking scientific consensus, on the one hand, and, on the other, to the long 
standing adjustements between evolving technologies and economic and other institutions. While 
health risks and ecological risks have been increasingly recognized, an intellectual preparation for 
such recogniton comes with Dewey’s warning of science’s limited ability to predict and control 
technology implementation and thus “the risks of the world” (LW1, 45). An intellectual 
preparation equally comes with the general theoretical emphasize Dewey put on understanding 
the complex and interdependent processes of organisms and their biophysical environments, 
sometimes by referring to the young science of ecology.53 Such preparation could be 
complemented by an historical lesson from large scale resource development projects in the US, 
such as the TVA: although emphasizing dangers of over-exploitation and pollution, TVA leaders 
failed to anticipate how large scale technological interventions damaged rivers’ ecosystems and 
biodiversity.54 In similar ways as the Green Revolution, with its monocultures and extensive use 
of pesticides and other chemicals, recognition of ecological degradation brought about through 
large scale resource development projects in rivers was slow in coming, and control over adverse 
consequences became costly and disruptive. 
The first necessary step on part of science, Dewey holds, is to recognize moral responsibilty 
for adverse consequences.55 Yet, for the pragmatist, fullfillment of such responsibilty is forward 
looking; like healing, fullfilment should “be preventive as well as curative” (LW9, 98). 
Epistemically, fullfilment of this prospective responsibility would need to go beyond prevailing 
compartmentalizations and specializations in science. Interdisciplinary organization is needed 
and terms for cooperation should be set, not by priorities of academic or ‘pure science’, but by 
the issues to be addressed. Dewey thus calls for a “unity of science” forged through practical 
                                                          
51 See Collingridge 1980, 13–15.  
52 Collingridge 1980, 25–27. 
53 See LW16, 117, 120.  
54 For a relatively early consideration of ecologically adverse effects of the TVA’s implementation and operations, 
see Krenkel and Lee et al 1979.   
55 See LW9, 98. 
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cooperation between scientists.56 However, in order to sustain social and democratic control over 
policies pertaining to natural resources and technology, inquiries need to engage ordinary 
citizens’ experiences of the impact of new technologies. Inquirers thus need to consider the “vast 
return wave” of science and technology into “uses and enjoyments (and sufferings) of everyday 
affairsˮ and how such “return wave” deeply affects the “judgment and … emotional affections, 
preferences, and aversions of everyday human beingsˮ (LW16, 253). The latter, Dewey suggests, 
is a necessary starting point for any attempt “to minimize evil consequences and to intensify and 
extend good consequencesˮ of this “return waveˮ (LW16, 256).  
 
5. Social inquiry: citizen participation and policy development  
In TPIP and elsewhere Dewey voices the need for social inquiry – inquiry which studies 
conflicting social situations and which potentially supports and enables democratic processes. 
However, for purposes of social inquiry, the very category of the social needs to be defined more 
inclusively than done or presupposed by specialized social sciences. For understanding how new 
technologies affect both consumers and producers, both physical and institutional aspects of the 
technologies must be taken into account.57 Likewise, in understanding how economic activities 
may affect an effective distribution of opportunities, land and natural resources, as well as 
technologies, should be included in the very categorization of the social.58 Consistent with this 
inclusive understanding Dewey suggests multiple ways of qualifying social groups and 
memberships as a point of departure for analyzing conflicting social situations. While “lines of 
demarcation [between groups] are ill-defined and overlapping” group membership can be 
construed along different lines: on economic criteria, in terms of “classes” or “occupational 
groups”, along “ideational” lines, as well as along “ethnic lines” (LC, 65). However, across such 
multiple criteria, he focuses on inter- og intragroups relations of dependence, domination or 
misrecognition that are embedded in social practices and institutions.59 While Dewey uses the 
example of how Western women and industrial workers have been denied formal rights and 
opportunities,60 one of the PL’s interventions was in support of ethnic groups subjected to 
misrecognition and neglect by US land policies. In 1930 the PL supported local tribes of Native 
Americans in a struggle over a federally liscenced private hydropower project in an Indian 
reservation in Flathead, Montana.61 Here and in other parts of the Northwest region Native 
                                                          
56 Dewey thus suggested that “convergence can best be attained by considering how various sciences may be 
brought together in common attack upon practical social problems” (LW13, 276) 
57 “A steam-locomotive or a dynamo is a physical fact in its structure; it is a social fact when its existence depends 
upon the desire for rapid and cheap transportation and communication. The machine itself may be understood 
physically without reference to human aim and motive. But the railway or public-utility system cannot be 
understood without reference to human purposes and human consequences” (LW6: 64). 
58 See LW3, 47–48.  
59 LC, 66–71, 92–96.  
60 LC, 76–79. 
61 See Lee 2015, 75.  
14 
 
Americans’ fisheries were devastated through large scale hydropower and irrigation projects.62 
Due to the vital economic import, but also the religious significance, of rivers and waterfalls for 
these indigenous communities, the latter were profoundly and irretrivably affected by prevailing 
land policies.  
Yet, how could social inquiry engage parties affected by implemented land polices? 
Dewey’s model of inquiry generally requires, firstly, that expert inquirers engage lay citizens’ 
through “a subtle, delicate, vivid and responsive art of communication” (LW2, 350) and by 
implementing “methods of discussion, consultation and persuasion” (LW2, 365). While division 
of cognitive labour between experts and lay people would be involved,63 participation on part of 
affected groups is required to adequately inform problem understanding and to anticipate relevant 
solutions. Secondly, research findings and proposed solutions should be distributed to inform and 
justify relevant policies, as well as to enable and inform citizens’ participation in public policy 
discussions. In so far, “communication of the results of social inquiry is the same as the 
formation of public opinion” (LW2, 345). As suggested by Herbert Reid and Betsy Taylor 
(2006), Dewey’s two requirements could be linked to recent developments in social science 
methodology and be exemplified through a now classical study of land ownership.   
 In 1979 a team of community organizers, activists, and academics collaborated to conduct 
a systematic study of landownership and taxation in Appalachia, a region streching over six states 
in the Eastern USA where coal and mineral corporations had established an enduring economic 
stronghold since the late 19th century.64 While during the Great Depression miners unions raised 
political demands across Central Appalachia, their conflicts with coal corporations were at times 
“dramatically quelled” (Gaventa 1980, 84) in ways that have continued to influence conflicts in 
the region after WWII.65 By the 1970s local communities faced loss of control over agricultural 
land, but also “severe and persistent poverty, high unemployment, low educational attainment, 
poor infrastructure, a lack of social and health services” (Scott 2008, 242), as well as serious 
environmental consequences of surface mining and stripmining coal.66 Against this historical 
background local community members’ experiences were decisive for stating the very problem to 
be inquired into by the land ownership study. Moreover, the study not only exemplifies Dewey’s 
general requirement of citizen participation: after receiving basic quantitative methodological 
training lay citizens participated as co-researchers, together with social science experts, and 
during different stages of the research process “the local knowledge … of the citizens was an 
asset to the … study” (Scott 2008, 241). Hence, the study has been recognized as “a pioneering 
effort in the interdisciplinary field of participatory action research” (Scott 2009, 186). In terms of 
its findings, the study strongly suggested that enduring land ownership patterns was a key for 
understanding a range of social and economic issues. By their out-of-state holding companies, 
                                                          
62 For an account of the history of the Flathead Indian Reservation and the struggles of the Flathead Native 
Americans’ for sovereignty, see Cahoon 2005. 
63 See Bohman 1999, 465, 476; Bohman 2004, 27–28,  
64 Appalachian Land Ownership Task Force 1983. 
65 See Gaventa 1980, 84. 
66See Scott 2008, 242. 
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coal and mineral corporations owned large tracts of land67 in the region; through low taxation 
rates, these ownership patterns indirectly contributed to the region’s poor health and social 
services.68 Corporate control over land, including power to keep land out of the market, further 
suggested underlying reasons for the low level of infrastructure and economic development.69 
Hence, the study confirmed Dewey’s philosophical point about taking land and technology into 
account in analyzing social phenomena, and it further brought out how effective private control 
over land, which “includes all mines, all minerals … as well as coal” (LW11, 256), may enable 
“a private monopolization of opportunity” and thus a situation where the “great masses … are 
dependent upon the will of others for opportunity” (LW11, 256). Moreover, consistent with 
Dewey’s second requirement above, findings were communicated to local communities and 
politicians, and they thus informed demands for strengthening local land owners’ rights against 
mining, for increasing federal power to confiscate corporate land for alternative economic 
development, as well as for more effective environmental regulation.70 Despite lack of significant 
structural political changes in its wake, the study can be linked to the emergence of enduring 
multi-issue civic organizations pursuing community development, environmental protection, and 
social justice.71 Hence, like the PL, these civic organizations have sought to establish alliances 
across civil society through adressing adverse consequences of economic activities. 
Nevertheless, the modest success of the Appalachia ownership study in terms of policy 
influence gives us pause to reflect on circumstances that might limit the prospects of sustaining 
democratic control through a Deweyan mode of inquiry. In fact, the early industrialization of 
central Appalachia suggests how local and national regulatory institutions have been increasingly 
undermined by the transnational scope of economic activities. Substantial parts of the early 
corporate land acquisition in the region were in fact admininstrated from London, the world’s 
financial centre in the 19th century.72 From a more general historical perspective, regulatory 
institutions in both North America and Western Europe were undermined by what historians of 
economics have qualified as the ‘First Great Globalization’. Culminating in the decades before 
World War One an increasingly integrated world market emerged due to factors such as new 
transporation and communication technologies, a shared gold standard for currencies, belief in 
free trade among key economic decision makers, as well imperialist access to natural resources 
                                                          
67 The study went through property tax data in 80 counties in the six Appalachia states and found that, in these 
counties, the samples represented 53 % of the total surface land, and in these samples corporations were found to 
own almost 40 % of the land and 70 % of the mineral rights (see Appalachian Land Ownership Task Force 1983, 14–
18). 
68 Appalachian Land Ownership Task Force 1983, 41–42, 57–63. 
69 Appalachian Land Ownership Task Force 1983, 68–79.  
70 See Scott 2008, 236. 
71 Such multi-issue organizations are  Alabama Arise (see Scott 2008, 244) and Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, 
which tackles “broad environmental, political, and social justice issues, ranging from opposing mountaintop 
removal and industrial hog farms to promoting low- income utility assistance programs and youth recreation 
centers (Scott 2008, 243). 




and cheap labour.73 As recently pointed out by John Naryan (2016), Dewey’s diagnosis of the 
problem of the public rests on premises that are in accordance with this historical perspective. 
Yet, as suggested by Dewey’s anticipation of Collingridge’s dilemma, Dewey was particularly 
concerned with the role and impact of science and technology in the global extension of 
economic activities. Hence, after World War One he put stress on the grave lack of regulation 
and control over the adverse consequences of new technologies, such as “brutal exploitation of 
nature and man in times of peace and high explosives and noxious gases in times of war” (LW2, 
344). In continuation of Naryan’s interpretation I will end by elaborating on how Dewey’s 
concern with the global extension of economic activities may reflect back on his 
conceptualization of the public as polity and its current relevance. In particular, I explore how the 
conceptualization may capture relationsships and associations that reach beyond a national polity 
and its institutions.  
 
6. The public: national polities and transnational solidarities 
In Dewey’s conceptualization of the public as polity mutual interest in control of conditions of 
economic activities serves as the basis for the democratic legitimacy of regulatory policies and 
institutions. Above I used the examples of the LIPA’s third party efforts and the PL’s 
organizational and communicative activities to suggest how a mutual and popular interest in 
control could be negotiated and articulated. The PL’s “support for a congressionally centered 
federal government” (Lee 2015, 8) further suggested how an articulated interest could become 
effective in exerting democratic control over regulatory policies through the institutions of 
representative democracy. Nevertheless, Dewey did assume an historical perspective that sees 
institutional capacities for regulation and democratic control as undermined by an emerging 
economic globalization.74 In TPIP he observed how national economies on both sides of the 
Atlantic had become interdependent and how new “industrial and commercial relations” have 
manifested themselves in “the struggle for raw materials, for distant markets, and in staggering 
national debts” (LW2, 315). He further saw the “plight of the [American] farmer” as a 
consequence of an emerging economic globalization of which the world war “was a 
manifestation” (LW2, 316): burdened with mortages farmers had became vulnerable to 
fluctuating prizes in an international market and to the devastating effects of inflation or 
deflation. Yet, how could Dewey’s conceptualization of the public as polity be adapted to the 
perspective concerning an evolving economic globalization? 
We first note with Naryan (2016) that Dewey’s intellectual and political response to the 
perceived economic globalization was twofold. On the one hand, he supported president 
W.Wilson’s initiative for the League of Nations to avoid a return to an imperial world order,75 
                                                          
73 See O’Rourke and Williamson 1999; and Rodrik 2011 (in particular pp. 24–26, 34–40, 138–140).  
74 b 2016, 45–51.   
75 See MW11, 139–142. Yet, in the mid-1920s Dewey became increasingly more critical to USA’s role in the League 
of Nations. In particular, he was concerned about the informal imperialism at work through USA’s exploitation of 
natural resources in Mexico (see Westbrook 1991, 259–262).   
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new instability and war. An intergovernmental organization should promote the “equality of labor 
standards” and an equalization of access to “food and raw materials” (MW11, 142). Dewey 
voiced the need for a “permanent international executive body” (MW11, 136), powerful enough 
to “insure an adequate adjustment of rights” even between internally conflicting segments of 
national polities (MW11, 137). On the other hand, however, such institution building should 
“encourage voluntary groupings all over the world, and thus promote social integration by means 
of the cooperation of democratically self-governed industrial and vocational groups” (MW11, 
105). In TPIP, observing the increasingly adverse consequences of economic globalization, he 
thought it necessary that, across nations, “the non-political forces organize themselves to 
transform existing political structures: that the divided and troubled publics integrate” (LW2, 
315). While inter-war North American farmers would be among Dewey’s prime examples of 
“divided and troubled publics”, we may extend the scope, geographically and historically, to 
farmers and peasants strongly affected by econonomic globalization in other parts of the world 
and in more recent times. Against the historical background of the Green Revolution, its 
spreading of agricultural technologies to developing countries, and the hegemonic role of 
neoliberal land policies in the global South after 1980,76 I adapt Dewey’s conceptualization of the 
public as polity to his call for transnational cooperation through a contemporary example.   
 Firstly, the conceptualization of the public as “related on the basis of mutual interest” 
(Dewey 1928) could be adapted to apply to agricultural producers (land owning farmers, tenant 
farmers, agricultural workers) that together with their local communities have lost control over 
land in a context of economic globalization, and that have a mutual interest in resisting loss of 
control and in claiming a right to use land. Across national borders such groups further have a 
mutual interest in cooperating and supporting each others’ causes through building transnational 
associations. Secondly, however, if, according to Dewey’s conceptualization, group members’ 
mutual interest is to provide a basis for the legitimacy of regulatory policies, intergovenmental, as 
well as national political institutions would be presupposed. Noting the ultimate failure of The 
League of Nations, the intergovernmental organization which originally provided Dewey’s 
historical model, but also Dewey’s later welcoming of UNESCO’s transnational inquiries into 
conceptions of human rights and democracy,77 the United Nation (UN) system evolving after 
World War Two serves as the best approximation, despite its lack of executive power to “insure 
an adequate adjustment of rights” (MW11, 137).  
To explore the relevance of this adaptation of Dewey’s conceptualization I consider the 
transnational network organization La Via Campesina (LVC) which emerged in the late 20th 
century as the largest organization of national and sub-national movements of poor peasants and 
small farmers in the global South and North.78 Having emerged in critical response to economic 
globalization, LVC promotes local producers’ rights to land and to control conditions of food 
production and consumption, while it resists corporate control over agricultural land enabled by 
                                                          
76 See Harvey 2005 (in particular pp. 101–104, 126–127, 160–161). 
77 LW16, 399–406.  
78 See Desmarais 2007; Borras and Franco 2010.  
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market-led land reforms and neo-liberal land policies since the late 1970s, particularly in nations 
in the South. In contrast to other transnational organizations of farmers, LVC has enabled 
representation and participation on part of the poorest agricultural producers.79 Its flat network 
organization structure may be seen to approximate Dewey’s ideal of transnational “cooperation 
of democratically self-governed … groups” (MW11, 105).  
Moreover, LVC’s struggle for peasants’ right to land has been conditioned and enabled by 
its interaction with the UN system. The very notion of peasants’ rights has been modelled on the 
UN’s framework of human rights.80 For this notion equitable access to land is stressed as a basic 
condition for livelihood and housing, as well as for sustaining one’s local community with food. 
In so far, this emphasis would accord with Dewey’s general understanding of land as a matter of 
“equal” and “fundamental opportunity”, and an opportunity “to be socially useful” (LW11, 256). 
Moreover, presupposing the model of the UN’s framework of human right’s, LVC has in turn and 
in effect acknowledged the UN system as a legitimate intergovenmental organization, while 
openly contesting the legitimacy of other organizations (the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization) responsible for promoting and regulating 
implementation of neo-liberal land policies on a global basis.81  
Epistemically, LVC’s ways of engaging in knowledge politics may seem to move beyond 
Deweyan principles of social inquiry. By contesting the use of sophisticated econometric 
methods for developing land policies while defending use of rural communities’ local 
knowledge,82 LVC tends to value epistemic contributions of lay people higher than does Dewey’s 
model for expert-lay cooperation, as exemplified by the Appalachia Landownership study. 
Nevertheless, LVC has cooperated with other expert groups in rearticulating and justifying local 
knowledge as a basis for ecologically sustainable practices, while rejecting typically Green 
Revolution technologies.83 Elaborating on the Deweyan model, one could thus say that the terms 
for the cooperation between lay and expert, and an associated cognitive division of labour, have 
been re-negotiated.84 Moreover, LVC’s knowledge politics re-evaluates and rehabilitates the 
practically based knowledge that is shared in peasant communities. In fact, claiming the 
relevance of pesants’ practical knowledge for policy making the organization may find support in 
Dewey’s criticism of “existing political practice” and its ignorance of “occupational groups and 
the organized knowledge and purposes that are involved in the existence of such groups” (LW11, 
50). In addition, LVC’s employment of new communication technologies for extensive and swift 
sharing of information85 harmonizes with Dewey’s other principle that “the results of social 
inquiry” (LW2, 345) should be distributed to inform relevant policies as well as to enable 
citizens’ participation in public discussion of policy solutions. In so far, political scientist Nora 
                                                          
79 Borras and Franco 2010, 119, 130–133.  
80 See La Via Campesina 2009. 
81 Borras and Franco 2010, 132–134. See also FIAN and La Via Campesina 2004. 
82 Borras and Franco 2010, 134. See also Desmarais 2007, 42–54.  
83 See Borras 2008: 266. 
84 See James Bohman’s qualification of Dewey’s model in a different context (1999, 465–466). 
85 See Borras and Franco 2010: 134. 
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Hanagan rightly points out that “the methods pursued by La Via Campesina are distinctly 
Deweyan” (2015, 43). 
Institutionally, this exemplification of the conceptualization of the public suggests how 
political participation may extend over different levels: local, national and transnational. In 
contrast to the PL and popular or civic associations in the Progressive Era, LVC exemplifies how 
new institutional spaces have been created for holding intergovernmental organizations, as well 
as national governments, accountable. Furthermore, the example suggests how relations of 
transnational solidarity have evolved that differ not only from the national alliances promoted by 
the PL and the LIPA, but from the kind of international solidaric engagement exerted by the PL 
for jeopardized groups abroad (such as Jews in Hitler’s Germany). The current example shows 
how relations of “mutual interest” could evolve as relations of mutual transnational solidarity 
between members of different national polities in the North and the South. 
Given its policy focus on land, however, the example stresses how transnational relations 
are anchored in national or sub-national associations involved in local struggles over land. When 
seen through the example, members of a Deweyan public would resist ways in which foreign 
corporate control over land undermine conditions for local communities’ livelihoods and forms 
of life, and how implementation of Green Revolution technologies may issue in environmental 
degradation that in turn severe conditions for small scale farming, fishing and forestry.86 
Addressing such adverse consequences members of the public justify policies for local control 
over land in terms of ecologically sustainable practices, and healthy food produced for local 
communities under socially just conditions.87 Propagating these justifications may be seen as new 
ways of performing democratic control and of holding governments accountable to segments 
negatively affected by prevailing land policies, like the Native Americans in Montana supported 
by the PL. Moreover, engaged in knowledge politics, local and national members may also 
contest formal expert-based ways of addressing adverse environmental consequences of 
industrial technologies, such as high CO2 emissions.88 At the heart of such knowledge politics, 
however, is the emphasis on local and practice based ways of conceiving land and human 
dependence on nature. In fact, the contestation of the privileged role of formal economical 
models for developing land policies could be seen to echo Dewey’s warning of relying 
exclusively on certain specialized and formal ways of understanding the earth, issuing in “a series 
of stratified earths, one of which is mathematical, another physical … and so on”, each of which 
is too much abstracted from the world in which we live (MW1, 54). Finally, LVC’s insistence on 
practice based ways of conceiving the meaning of land in effect updates Dewey’s call for 
learning about our bio-physical environments through practical arts and occupations, given that 
“it is through these occupations that the intellectual and emotional interpretation of nature has 
been developed”, and that “[i]t is through what we do in and with the world that we read its 
meaning and measure its value” (MW1, 13).  
                                                          
86 See Rosset and Martinez-Torres 2012. 
87 See Alonso-Fradejas et al 2015. 
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